How Citizens' Views of Democracy Impact Their Evaluation of Metropolitan Governance Arrangements: Evidence From a Comparative Conjoint Experiment

Strebel, Michael A ; Kübler, Daniel ; Marcinkowski, Frank

Abstract: What features are important for democracy from a citizens' perspective? How do citizens' views of what democracy should be translate into their day-to-day evaluation of real-existing institutions? These questions have gained a renewed interest in scholarly debates as the notion of democracy as a multi-layered and contested concept has become dominant. Existing research assesses what views of democracy citizens hold and how they combine into different models, but they tell us little about what citizens prefer when they cannot maximize all dimensions at the same time. We shed light on this question by analyzing citizens' evaluations of different governance arrangements that vary with respect to their input-, throughput- and output-legitimacy and their formal authority. We draw on data from an online-conjoint experiment conducted in eight metropolitan areas in France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. We find, first, that output-legitimacy is the most important driver for citizens' choice of a governance arrangement. Second, we find that the importance citizens attribute to different dimensions of these governance bodies is a function of their more general views of democracy. Yet, third, the output-dimension is the most important driver for citizens' choice of a governance arrangement, irrespective of their views of democracy. Our findings suggest that political actors and institutions can gain legitimacy primarily through the provision of "good output". However, democratic procedures in the form of input- and throughput-legitimacy remain important traits of democratic governance.

How Citizens' Views of Democracy Impact Their Evaluation of Metropolitan Governance Arrangements: Evidence From a Comparative Conjoint Experiment

Michael A. Strebel[*], Daniel Kübler[*], Frank Marcinkowski[**]

[*]Department of Political Science, University of Zurich [**]Department of Communication, University of Muenster

Abstract

What features are important for democracy from a citizens' perspective? How do citizens' views of what democracy should be translate into their day-to-day evaluation of real-existing institutions? These questions have gained a renewed interest in scholarly debates as the notion of democracy as a multi-layered and contested concept has become dominant. Existing research assesses what views of democracy citizens hold and how they combine into different models, but they tell us little about what citizens prefer when they cannot maximize all dimensions at the same time. We shed light on this question by analyzing citizens' evaluations of different governance arrangements that vary with respect to their input-, throughput- and output-legitimacy and their formal authority. We draw on data from an online-conjoint experiment conducted in eight metropolitan areas in France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. We find, first, that output-legitimacy is the most important driver for citizens' choice of a governance arrangement. Second, we find that the importance citizens attribute to different dimensions of these governance bodies is a function of their more general views of democracy. Yet, third, the output-dimension is the most important driver for citizens' choice of a governance arrangement, irrespective of their views of democracy. Our findings suggest that political actors and institutions can gain legitimacy primarily through the provision of "good output". However, democratic procedures in the form of input- and throughput-legitimacy remain important traits of democratic governance.

Keywords: Democratic Legitimacy, Views of Democracy, Democratic Governance, Citizen Perceptions, Conjoint Analysis

Version: 15.08.2016

Introduction

What do citizens expect from democratic governance? Under which circumstances do citizens evaluate a political system in a favorable way? Political scientists have been studying these questions for decades (Easton 1965, Norris 1999). A prominent distinction made in these debates is the one between the input- and the output-legitimacy of a political system (Scharpf 1999). One demand to the political system can be to provide opportunities for influencing decision-making and outcomes through political participation. A second demand to the political system can be to "effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question" (Scharpf 1999, 6). While meaningful input to and good output from a political system can perfectly go together and jointly enhance the system's legitimacy, they sometimes can be at odds with each other: When citizens have many options to participate in politics and influence decision-making processes, this might render the efficient production of output difficult because finding consensus gets more demanding. In a similar vein, "the democratic process may impair important substantive rights or other requirements of justice" (Bühlmann and Kriesi 2013, 45).

How do citizens view such trade-offs? And what do they value about democracy? In 2012, the renowned European Social Survey included a series of questions with the aim to assess citizens' conceptions of democracy (European Social Survey 2012). The stated aim was to capture "the variety of conceptions of democracy that exist among Europeans" (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016, 2) to assess what dimensions of democratic politics citizens deem important and which aspects of democracy cluster together when one takes on a citizen's perspective. Their results reveal that most Europeans share a minimal definition of democracy but also that they differ substantively in their views about the additional functions a democracy should fulfill (Kriesi et al. 2016).

While this study represents a great leap forward in research on citizens' views and evaluations of democracy, it leaves important questions unaddressed.[1] Most importantly, we do know little about whether and how these more abstract views translate into evaluations of specific political institutions: What dimensions of democratic legitimacy do citizens rely on when they are asked to evaluate specific governance arrangements[2]? Are they guided by their

[1] In this paper, we follow Ferrín and Kriesi (2016) in the use of the terminology. "Views of democracy" denote citizens' norms orientations on a more abstract level: What features are generally important for any democracy? "Evaluations of democracy" on the other hand denote citizens' assessment of real-existing democracies or specific political institutions.

[2] With the term "specific governance arrangements" we refer to decision-making bodies or institutions that are vested with a certain amount of political power. Those can be traditional political institutions such as parliaments

views on democracy in their evaluation of specific political objects? Or are some dimensions of these governance arrangements deemed more important irrespective of the views that citizens hold on a more abstract level?

We address these questions by analyzing citizens' evaluations of a specific subnational governance arrangement. We draw on unique data from a cross-national online-survey experiment which was conducted in eight metropolitan areas in Switzerland, Germany, France and the UK. In this conjoint experiment, citizens were asked to evaluate governance arrangements that have the task to design and implement a major public transport project in the respondents' metropolitan area. These governance arrangements varied with respect to the nature of their input-, throughput-, and output-legitimacy – dimensions deemed important for democratic legitimacy (Scharpf 1999, Schmidt 2013) – as well as with respect to their formal authority (Hooghe and Marks 2015). The use of conjoint analysis allows for assessing multi-dimensional choices and to assess the "causal effects of various components of a treatment in survey experiments" (Hainmueller et al. 2014, 2). More importantly, however, it allows us to analyze which dimensions of these governance arrangements are deemed more or less important – when not all of them can be maximized simultaneously.

The results suggest, first, that citizens are mostly concerned with output-legitimacy and to a lesser extent with throughput-legitimacy in metropolitan governance arrangements. Furthermore, ex-post approval of supra-local decision-making by local governments is deemed important as well. Second, citizens' views of democracy seem to guide their evaluation of governance arrangements when it comes to the importance of the input- and the throughput-dimension. However, the output-dimension is deemed the most important one irrespective of the democratic views citizens hold.

---

or executives; or more network-based decision-making bodies that are only loosely coupled to representative bodies and include non-elected actors. To use the terminology of Hooghe and Marks (2003), we refer to both type-I and type-II governance bodies.

Theoretical Argument

Procedure vs. Substance: What Type of Legitimacy Do Citizens Prefer?

Is democracy about "procedures" or about "substance"? How do political systems obtain their legitimacy? Through procedures that live up to democratic standards? Or rather by providing good outcomes? In political theory this is a debated issue (for an overview see Cohen 1997). Advocates of a substantive account in political theory put forward the idea that the normative value of democracy lies in the output it produces. Procedures alone are not sufficient to generate legitimacy and are mostly conceived as a means to an end (Arneson 2003). In this line of thought, democracy needs to "promote the common welfare of the people" (Bühlmann and Kriesi 2013, 44) to be legitimate. Proceduralists, on the other hand, criticize that outcomes are always contested. Good procedures are seen as the only way of generating democratic legitimacy in an uncontested way (Dahl 1998).

Empirical political scientists are equally interested in the question of what makes a political system legitimate in the eyes of its constituency (Easton 1965). Traditionally, political systems are conceived as having two possibilities to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens: through allowing for democratic input to the system and through providing good output from the system. Drawing on Scharpf (1999: 6 ff.), we can define input-oriented legitimizing views as emphasizing 'government by the people', i.e. that political choices are assessed against the extent to which they represent the authentic preferences of a community - the will of the people. Popular votes or direct election of representatives are examples of procedures that aim to ensure input-oriented legitimacy of political decisions. By contrast, output-oriented legitimizing views emphasize 'government for the people', i.e. that political choices are assessed against the extent to which they effectively promote the common welfare of a community – the well-being of the people. The effectiveness of policies in solving public problems, or the performance of state agencies in delivering public services are examples of sources for output-oriented legitimacy. More recently, scholars introduced a third way for a political system to obtain legitimacy, namely "throughput". Throughput legitimacy concerns the quality of (internal) governing processes of the institutions and actors concerned with policy-making (Schmidt 2013). Throughput-legitimacy can, for instance, be enhanced by a transparent way of policy-making – i.e. through public negotiation and decision-making processes (Héritier 2003) or by a good quality of deliberation in decision-making bodies – i.e. discussions and decisions based on reasons and not on political power considerations only (cf. Papadopoulos and Warin 2007). In sum, "'throughput' legitimacy concentrates on what goes

on inside the 'black box'" between the input to, and the output from a political system (Schmidt 2013).

Which of these three principles is the most important for citizens' positive evaluations of governance arrangements? For the evaluation of European Union governance, Fuchs (2011) finds that instrumental considerations (e.g. personal and national benefits) are the most important correlates. In contrast, Hooghe and Marks (2004) find an exclusive national identity to have a more negative effect on EU support than a favorable economic calculus having a positive one. In an analysis of 54 third-wave democracies, Chu et al. (2008) find that citizens' support for the claim that democracy is the best form of government is not heavily affected by a bad evaluation of a regime's economic performance. At the same time, Dalton (2004, 74-76) finds that citizens' support for incumbents and for political institutions strongly depends on the assessment of their personal financial situation. Moving to the local level, Denters (2014) finds that functional and procedural considerations are equally important for explaining satisfaction with local democracy. On the other hand, Perry (2014) finds that satisfaction with the performance of local institutions is the most important driver of local attachment – an indicator for diffuse system support (Norris 1999).

What do these findings mean for the evaluation of specific governance arrangements? The results from Dalton's (2004) study suggest that for the evaluation of specific governance arrangements, factors related to the output of political systems are deemed more important than factors related to the input of political systems (see also Rothstein 2009, Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014 for similar arguments). This is in line with Scharpf's (1999, 2) main claim in his seminal book *Governing in Europe*. He states that "the weakening of political legitimacy in Western Europe is a consequence of the loss of problem-solving capacities of political systems". Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that there is an increasing emphasis on performance legitimacy for the evaluation of democratic regimes (Haus 2014). For our assessment of citizens' evaluation of specific governance arrangements we accordingly posit that substance trumps procedure or, put differently, that output- is deemed more important than throughput- and input-legitimacy. Our first hypothesis reads as follows:

H1: Output is a more important driver than input or throughput for citizens' evaluation of specific governance arrangements ("*Substance"-Hypothesis*)

How Do Citizens' Views of Democracy Guide Their Evaluation of Governance Arrangements?

Admittedly, this hypothesis is rather blunt. One can justifiably argue that not all citizens prefer output over throughput and input in their evaluation. More precisely, what citizens

deem important when evaluating specific governance arrangements might depend on their more abstract view of democracy. Democracy is a multilayered and complex, if not contested concept, both theoretically and empirically. Scholars identified a variety of both ideal typical and empirical models of democracy (Held 2006, Coppedge and Gerring 2011, Lijphart 2012). Some of these models put a stronger focus on citizen participation, while others value checks and balances. Some scholars advocate a minimalist definition of democracy, and others promote a very maximalist definition (Schumpeter 2010, Barber 1984).

But what do ordinary citizens think about when they think about democracy? Different scholars have pointed out that citizens hold different views about what democracy should be (Fuchs 1999, Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). However, until recently, a comprehensive analysis of citizens' views of democracy was missing. This changed with the aforementioned European Social Survey (2012). In this survey citizens were asked to assess the importance of sixteen different items capturing different dimensions of democracy. In *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*, Ferrín and Kriesi (2016) – together with a team of researchers – analyze these assessments. They find that a minimal definition of liberal democracy – free and fair elections and equality before the law – is widely accepted across Europe (73.1% of respondents view these two elements as necessary conditions for democracy). Yet, they also find that beyond this minimal definition, citizens can be distinguished into different types of democrats. Some of them adhere to additional components of liberal democracy (such as having a free press, protecting minorities and independent courts) while others combine this minimal definition with democratic norms that are connected to a more substantive (i.e. social justice) or to a more direct-democratic vision of democracy (Kriesi et al. 2016). The social justice understanding is captured through support for income redistribution and protection against poverty, while the direct-democratic understanding is captured through support for referendums. A third of all respondents can be called "fully committed democrats" that adhere to all three models of democracy (Kriesi et al. 2016, 86) but the rest of them is eclectic and cherishes some democratic norms while neglecting others.[3]

What does this mean for our question about citizens' evaluations of specific governance arrangements? A straightforward assumption based on these findings is that citizens' emphasize those features of specific governance arrangements in their evaluation which correspond to their more abstract views about what is important for democracy. Facing the

[3] Whether someone is a liberal-, a direct- or a social justice-democrat depends on a number of factors. The most important of them is the status of an individual. High-status individuals (high-skilled and/or high income) endorse a liberal understanding of democracy to a bigger extent than low-status individuals, which tend to a social justice understanding of democracy. However, the effects of these individual-level factors vary across different institutional and historical contexts (Ceka and Magalhães 2016).

challenge to make a choice in a specific situation, individuals often rely on their fundamental value orientations. Citizens' views about what is important for democracy can be conceived as value orientations that structure decision-making in a specific choice situation. Our second hypothesis accordingly reads as follows:

H2: Citizens evaluate specific governance arrangements more favorably whose features are in line with their views on democracy. ("*Democratic Models"-Hypothesis*)

The Prevalence of Output over Democratic Norms

Under certain circumstances, Hypothesis 1 and 2 can be in conflict with each other. What should we citizens expect to do when a specific governance arrangement has a high output quality but goes against their views of democracy? Would they choose it over an arrangement that fulfills their democratic norm orientations but is suboptimal in terms of output quality? We argue here that this is the case and that output trumps other democratic views. In line with Scharpf's (1999) claim we assume that a satisfactory output is the most important condition for the legitimacy of a political system. Procedural characteristics are second order – even if one holds them in high esteem on a more abstract level. To a certain extent, this idea can be connected to Maslow's (1943) research on individual needs. He assumes that a hierarchy of needs exist and that higher ranked needs only become salient once lower ranked needs are satisfied. In our view, the output of a certain governance arrangement could be seen as a lower ranked need that has to be fulfilled to a satisfactory degree before any higher ranked need – in our case more procedural democratic norms – become salient. Indirect evidence for this idea comes from Ceka and Magalhães (2016, 110) who build on the models from Kriesi et al (2016) introduced above and analyze how socio-demographic characteristics are linked to preferences for one or another model of democracy. They find that "in most countries, an understanding of democracy that is intrinsically concerned with social justice [i.e. substance-oriented] is clearly more espoused by lower status individuals than higher status ones." For evaluations of specific governance arrangements, this implies that they have to fulfill some basic requirements in the form of satisfactory output – even if citizens' cherish procedural views of democracy on a more abstract level. Our last hypothesis, thus, reads as follows:

H3: When citizens have to choose between maximizing output and maximizing their views of democracy, they choose governance arrangements that maximize output ("*Prevalence of Output"-Hypothesis*)

Research Design

To test the hypotheses formulated in the previous sections, we use a survey-based experimental design. Since we are interested in the features of governance arrangements that drive citizens' evaluations, an experimental design is the best strategy. It allows for random variation of said features and for checking how these variations affect citizens' evaluations of governance arrangements. A limitation of traditional experimental designs is that they only allow for assessing the effect of one treatment at a time. However, our endeavor is to analyze citizens' reaction to different features that vary simultaneously. Put differently, the treatment consists of multiple components of which all are expected to have an impact. To analyze the effects of such multi-dimensional treatments, Hainmueller et al. (2014, 2) propose conjoint analysis "as a tool to identify the causal effects of various components of a treatment in survey experiments." In our case, the features of a governance arrangement are the components, whose effects on citizens' evaluations we want to assess and conjoint analysis is, thus, a well-suited experimental design for our endeavor.

The Context: Metropolitan Governance Arrangements

So far, we only spoke of "governance arrangements" in a very broad sense. This subsection discusses the context and the precise features of the governance arrangement assessed here. We focus our analysis on governance arrangements in metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas are congregations of geographically and functionally linked and interconnected urban and suburban territories. In most cases, a number of suburban towns and villages cluster around one or more center cities.[4] Metropolitan areas are not only the core sites of 21st century economic activity and capitalist competition (Brenner 2003), they are also the main habitat of the human species since 2010 (World Bank 2016). This metropolitanization of economic and social interactions also creates challenges for the governance of these areas. An increasing number of issues require solutions that transcend local boundaries and require the cooperation and coordination of local governments in these regions (Heinelt and Kübler 2005, Kübler and Pagano 2012).

We center our analysis on the issue of public transportation. Public transportation is a paradigmatic case of a metropolitan problem that requires coordination between different political actors in metropolitan areas (Gerber and Gibson 2009, 635). The purpose of public

[4] Statistical offices usually define metropolitan areas through commuting patterns between the cities, towns and villages in an area. When the amount of out- and in-commuters to and from other places in the area exceeds a certain threshold, a place is considered to be part of the area. However, the precise definitions of metropolitan areas vary across different countries. For having a comparable definition of metropolitan areas, we therefore rely on the definition of Eurostat's (2014) "larger urban zones."

transportation is to connect places to enable a quick movement of people from A to B. This increased connectivity in turn results in higher degrees of metropolitanization because it allows people to live in one place and work in another. It is, thus, pivotal for successful public transportation planning that the relevant actors cooperate across municipal boundaries.

But why should we analyze citizens' attitudes towards public transportation governance arrangements in metropolitan areas? What can this very specific case tell us about our general hypotheses?

First of all, political attitudes towards metropolitan governance arrangements are an interesting object of study in themselves. Since the Second World War, there are debates about how to organize governance in metropolitan areas (Bromage 1958, Savitch and Vogel 2009). Yet, so far we know very little about citizens' perceptions of these different propositions. Only recently, scholars began to study citizens' perceptions of the metropolitan level (Lidström 2013, Kübler 2016, Lackowska and Mikuła 2016). The questions asked in these studies are very varied, however, and a systematic, cross-national assessment of citizens' evaluations of metropolitan governance arrangements is still missing.

Our analysis is not only interesting for scholars of metropolitan governance, however. If we want to know whether citizens are guided by their views on democracy for their evaluation of specific governance arrangements, metropolitan governance arrangements are a least likely case to test this assumption (Gerring 2007). Citizens are usually not very familiar with metropolitan governance arrangements and their knowledge about metropolitan governance is limited (Swianiewicz and Lackowska 2007). While metropolitan areas are ideologically divided spaces – mostly between center cities and suburbs – these ideological divides are not about the way in which metropolitan areas should be governed (Sellers et al. 2013). Metropolitan governance is a largely de-politicized issue (Deas 2014) and citizens are thus not often confronted with it. For our study, this means that when citizens use their views on democracy for evaluating such governance arrangements even in a case which is quite remote from traditional political institutions, we can reasonably expect that they also do so when they are more familiar with a certain governance arrangement. While citizens are not familiar with metropolitan governance arrangements, they certainly are with the policy area of public transportation. The quality of public transportation affects the daily life of many metropolitan residents and they thus have a vital stake in how public transport governance works.

The Scenario: A Commission for an Underground Line Construction in the Metropolis

The specific story we chose for assessing citizens' evaluation of metropolitan governance arrangements can be found in table 1. In a first step, respondents were asked to imagine that a new underground train line was built in their region and that a commission was established to define, design and carry out this project. The term 'commission' was deliberately vague, to avoid respondents making any implicit references to existing agencies or authorities in their metropolitan area of residence.

In a second step, respondents' preferences for commissions that varied on five attributes (see below) were measured. More precisely, each respondent was presented with three choice tasks of opposing pairs of different commissions, in which she had to indicate the one of the two commissions she liked better. In addition, respondents were asked to rate each commission on a scale from 1-7 (see table 2 for an example). Each commission consisted of a random combination of attribute levels and the order of the five attributes was randomized across respondents but remained constant within respondents. This means that each respondent was presented with a different order of the attributes, but that this order remained constant over the three choice tasks.[5]

While the choice and the rating of a commission represent the dependent variables, the five attributes constitute the independent variables in the conjoint analysis. Three of these attributes operationalize the different dimensions of democratic legitimacy and two of them operationalize the formal authority a commission holds. The first attribute refers to the composition of a commission and the aim is to vary its degree of input-legitimacy. More precisely, this attribute has three levels that were varied randomly across commissions shown to the respondents: decision-makers could either be directly elected by citizens, delegated by local authorities, or appointed independent technical experts. Elected members represent the most direct possibility for input by the citizens, and thus reflect the idea of a democratically elected metropolitan government in scholarly debates (Lefèvre 1998, Gerber and Gibson 2009). Delegate members are only indirectly linked to the citizens. This composition reflects inter-municipal cooperation arrangements in many European countries (Hulst and Van Montfort 2007). Finally, an expert commission has no link to citizens and thus the least input legitimacy.

The second attribute aims to capture throughput legitimacy. A central criterion for throughput legitimacy is the transparency of the negotiation- and the decision-making process

[5] This can prevent "attribute order effects" – effects that occur only because of the position of an attribute.

(Héritier 2003). Only this allows citizens to evaluate the different arguments made and hold the respective actors accountable for their actions (Haus 2014). Therefore, we operationalize this dimension by two attribute levels that measure whether these decision-making processes were public or not.

Finally, the third attribute captures the efficiency of a commission's work and, thus, one dimension of output legitimacy. While one might argue that the effectiveness – the quality with which the project was implemented in the end – is more important, we decided to vary the commission's efficiency. A variation in the success of the project would have been too dominant in influencing respondents' choices.[6] Accordingly, we varied the extent to which the budget was over-run by the commission: 0 to 10 percent, 10 to 20 percent, 20 to 30 percent.

While the main aim of the experiment is to assess the impact of the three legitimacy dimensions, we control for different degrees of a commission's formal authority. When a commission's formal authority varies, respondents could be expected to change the weight they give to different dimensions of democratic legitimacy.[7] For the operationalization of formal authority, we relied on two indicators proposed by Hooghe and Marks (2015, 315) for measuring delegation and pooling of formal authority in international organizations. Both of these indicators belong to the "pooling"-dimension. This is the case because "[d]elegation is a grant of authority to a third party" (ibid.) Delegation, thus, refers to the tasks of an organization. This is already captured in our introductory story[8] and is, thus, not part of the randomized treatment. Furthermore, we combined Hooghe and Marks (2015) "bindingness" and "ratification" of a decision into one single attribute which captures the veto power of local

[6] Indeed, in our pretest we used a different formulation for the budget-attribute with only two attribute levels ("the budget is undershot or respected" vs. "the budget is overshot"). This produced very strong effects and we decided to attenuate the formulation a bit. If we find such strong effects for efficiency already (where it's only about *how* something is implemented, and not *if*), we might expect much stronger effects for a variation in efficacy (something is implemented vs something is not implemented). The budget over-run attribute is thus a rather conservative operationalization of the output dimension. Furthermore, the operationalization through three different degrees of budget over-run is also more realistic with respect to real-world situations, since many big infrastructure projects consume more financial resources than initially budgeted.

[7] For instance, when a decision comes into force, without further agreement of local authorities, citizens' might be more concerned about having an influence on determining the decision-makers than when there's a veto power of local authorities.

[8] "Imagine that the public authorities in the [X] region have decided to build a new underground line to relieve traffic congestion. To do so, a commission is established to plan this new underground (routing, location of stops) and coordinate construction."

governments. We have done so first to reduce the complexity of the experiment[9] and second, to prevent non-logical combinations of attribute levels[10].

Table 1: Attributes and Attribute Levels for Conjoint Analysis

[Introductory Text / Scenario] Over the next 20 years an increase in traffic is expected for the [X] region. The existing public transport network is reaching its limits. Imagine that the public authorities in the [X] region have decided to build a new underground line to relieve traffic congestion. To do so, a commission is established to plan this new underground (routing, location of stops) and coordinate construction. How do you think this commission should be set up? How should it function? We will now present you three times with two possibilities. Please indicate each time, which of the two commissions you would prefer – regardless of whether you support a new underground line in the [X] region or not.	
[Attribute]	[Attribute Levels]
The members of the commission… [Input Legitimacy: Members]	1) are directly elected by the citizens of the [X] region [Elected] 2) represent the local authorities in the [X] region [Delegates] 3) are independent experts [Experts]
Relationship of the commission with the public [Throughput Legitimacy: Transparency]	1) All documents and negotiations are public [Public] 2) Only the final decisions will be made public, the negotiations are not open to the public [Not Public]
Cost awareness of the commission [Output Legitimacy: Budget Over-Run]	1) The project budget is exceeded by 0-10% [0-10%] 2) The project budget is exceeded by 10-20% [10-20%] 3) The project budget is exceeded by 20-30% [20-30%]
The commission makes decisions… [Formal Authority: Decision Mode]	1) by majority vote [Majority] 2) unanimously [Unanimous]
The commission's decisions … [Formal Authority: Implementation]	1) come into force without further agreement of the local authorities in the [X] region [No Approval] 2) only come into force when approved by the local authorities in the [X] region [Approval]

These five attributes and their two- to three attribute levels yield a total of 72 possible commissions ($2^3*3^2=72$) and 2556 possible combinations of commissions (72*71/2=2556). Each respondent was presented with three choice tasks, i.e. was asked to indicate the preferred commission in three pairwise comparisons. A total of 5052 respondents participated in our survey (see below) which means that – on average – each possible combination was evaluated

9 For example, the difference between a decision not being binding for the involved actors and it having to be ratified by them is a very subtle one that is difficult to grasp for respondents.

10 It, for example, could be perceived as a contradiction for a decision to be binding for and to require ratification by local authorities at the same time.

almost 12 times (5052*6/2556=11.8) and each commission was on average evaluated 421 times (5052*6/72=421). In contrast to other conjoint analysis, in which only a sample of possible combinations is assessed (Hainmueller et al. 2014), in our case each combination was assessed several times. This is a benefit and increases the validity of our results.

Table 2: Example of Choice Task

"Here we go. This is the first of three paired comparisons:

	Commission A	***Commission B***
The members of the commission…	Are directly elected by the citizens of the [X] region	Represent the local authorities in the [X] region
The commission makes decisions…	Unanimously	Unanimously
The commission's decisions …	Only come into force when approved by the local authorities in the [X] region	Come into force without further agreement of the local authorities in the [X] region
Relationship of the commission with the public	All documents and negotiations are public	All documents and negotiations are public
Cost awareness of the commission	The project budget is exceeded by 20-30%	The project budget is exceeded by 0-10%

Which of these two commissions do you prefer? □***A*** □***B***

How would you rate **Commission A** on a scale from 1 to 7? 1 indicates that you "don't approve at all" and 7 indicates that you "strongly approve" the commission

Don't approve at all						*Strongly approve*
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
□	□	□	□	□	□	□

How would you rate **Commission B** on this scale?

Don't approve at all						*Strongly approve*
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
□	□	□	□	□	□	□

For our second hypothesis, we need an additional measure for citizens' views of democracy. To assess these views, our questionnaire was inspired by the European Social Survey (2012) items but we departed from them in an important way. As one can see from figure 1, items in the European Social Survey where on average attributed an importance over 8 on a scale from 0 to 10, which is a clearly left-skewed distribution. This means, that it is difficult to say what norm citizens prefer in case they have to choose, especially if everything is deemed important. We, therefore, asked citizens to assess two items at the same time that stated opposite claims of what is 'important' in a democracy (the items can be found in table A.1 in the appendix). In figure 1, the mean value of these 10 items is depicted. While the answers are still leaning more towards approval of the 10 items, this is less the case than for the one-sided items asked in the European Social Survey. These ten items, or five "democratic

trade-offs" respectively, allowed us to directly calculate which democratic norm citizens prefer over another one by subtracting the first statement from the second one. Histograms for these five democratic trade-offs can be found in the appendix in figure A.1.[11]

Figure 1: Average importance of 16 ESS norms of democracy



Note. Own Calculations. Data Source: European Social Survey (2012), Own Data. The survey question in the ESS was: How important do you think it is in a democracy that […]. Items could be rated on a scale from 0-10, where 0 means "not important at all" and 10 means "very important". The survey question for the democratic trade-offs was: "Often democracy is a compromise. Please tell us what you think about the following statements:" Items could be rated on a scale from 0-10, where 0 means "not important at all" and 10 means "very important"

The Data: An Online-Survey in Eight Metropolitan Areas

The data for this study stem from an online-survey that was conducted in eight metropolitan areas in four countries. It was fielded in fall 2015 and includes a total of 5052 interviews of representative samples of the resident population aged 18 to 75 in two French, two German, two Swiss and two British metropolitan areas.

The distribution of respondents within metropolitan areas reflects the spatial distribution in the basic population of these areas (see table 3). The countries and the metropolitan areas were selected according to a most-different-case-design logic (Gerring 2007). Two of the countries are federal and their principal subnational tier have a high degree of regional authority, while the two other countries are unitary and their principal subnational tier have a rather low degree of regional authority (Hooghe et al. 2016). In each country the capital

[11] It was quite frequent that citizens did not prefer one norm over the other, i.e. attributed the same importance to them. We take this middle category into account in our analysis (see below).

region and another major metropolitan area was chosen. Some of these areas have a government tier that encompasses the functional metropolitan area (i.e. a metropolitan government) and others don't. Finally, the metropolitan areas differ quite substantively in their population size. If we find similar results across these different cases, this provides a strong basis for a generalization of the findings beyond the eight metropolitan areas and to other European countries.

Respondents were recruited in different ways in the four countries. In Switzerland, a random sample of 2257 valid individual addresses of the resident population (aged 18 to 75) in the Bern and Zurich metropolitan areas was drawn by the Swiss Statistical Office. For the field phase we relied on the Swiss Survey Institute MIS Trend. Invitation letters to fill in an online questionnaire were sent to all these individuals, together with an unconditional incentive of 10 Swiss Francs (~10.12 US$).

Table 3: Case Selection and Data

Country	State Structure	RAI-Score	Metro. Area	Capital	Metro. Gov.	Population (2012)	Survey-Respondents		
							Cent.	Surr.	Tot.
CH	Federal	26.5	Bern	Yes	No	360,127	193 (35%)	366 (65%)	559 (100%)
			Zurich	No	No	1,217,751	188 (31%)	419 (69%)	607 (100%)
DE	Federal	24	Berlin	Yes	No	4,951,687	494 (76%)	158 (24%)	652 (100%)
			Stuttgart	No	Yes	2,647,134	153 (25%)	453 (75%)	606 (100%)
FR	Unitary	10	Lyon	No	Yes	1,934,717	194 (29%)	473 (71%)	667 (100%)
			Paris	Yes	No	11,800,687	119 (19%)	522 (81%)	641 (100%)
UK	Unitary	5	London	Yes	Yes	12,208,100	226 (34%)	440 (66%)	666 (100%)
			Birming-ham	No	No	2.873,800	349 (53%)	305 (47%)	654 (100%)
						Total	1916 (38%)	3136 (62%)	5052 (100%)

Note. RAI-Score=Regional Authority Index-Score (2010) by Hooghe et al. (2016) (0-27), Metro. Gov.=Metropolitan Government, Cent.=Residents in centre city, Surr.=Residents in surrounding area, Tot.=Total.

A first reminder was sent two weeks after the initial letter, a second reminder was sent after one month to those individuals who had not replied by then. The second reminder included a paper version of the questionnaire and a prepaid return envelope. Individual identifiers were used for each potential respondent in order to exclude multiple responses to the survey. All in all, 1162 respondents filled in the questionnaire, either online (n=936) or on paper (n=226). The response rate (calculated on the valid addresses) is 52 percent. The field phase of the survey in Switzerland lasted from mid-September 2015 to early January 2016.

In the remaining three countries, respondents were recruited from online-access panels and a quota-sampling strategy was applied to mirror the distribution of core features of the basic

population (i.e. residence in the core city or the suburbs, sex, age, employment status and education level). In these three countries, the survey was fielded by the international Survey Institute TNS Infratest. The field phase lasted from beginning of October to end of November. In this period between 606 and 667 complete interviews were conducted in each metropolitan area (see table 3). Respondents were incentivized through coupons by the panel providers.[12]

Estimation Strategy and Robustness Checks

For our analysis we rely on the –cjoint– package in R developed by Hainmueller et al. (2014). As mentioned before in the research design section, each respondent was presented with three choice tasks and accordingly evaluated six commissions. This means that choices are nested within respondents and that implies a transformation of the dataset: For each respondent we do not have one but six rows in the dataset. The unit of analysis is, thus, one commission. To account for the nested-ness of the commissions within respondents, we use clustered standard errors as it is suggested by Hainmueller et al. (2014). The independent variables – i.e. the five attributes – are introduced to the regression equation as dummy variables. This means that one of the attribute levels serves as the baseline in the models. The estimates one obtains through the use of the –cjoint– package are *average marginal component effects* (Hainmueller et al. 2014). This estimate can be interpreted as the effect of an individual treatment *component* – the whole commission or attribute combination being the treatment. More precisely, "the *average marginal component effect* (AMCE) represents the marginal effect of attribute *l* averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining attributes" (Hainmueller et al. 2014, 10). For the first dependent variable – the forced choice of one of the two commissions (see research design section) – this quantity can be interpreted as the percentage point change in the probability of choosing a commission when a certain attribute changes from the baseline level to the level of interest. For the second dependent variable – the rating of a commission – this quantity represents the change on the 1-7 scale when an attribute changes from the baseline level to the level of interest. In what follows, we will interpret the effects of the first dependent variable. The substantive results for the rating variable do not differ from the results for the forced choice variable (see figure A.3 in the appendix).

For the analysis, we deleted rows with missing values for the dependent variables listwise (see figure A.2 in the appendix). The number of missing values is very low compared to the overall number of rows (102 rows out of 30312) and should, thus, not represent a problem. In

[12] Due to the quota sampling procedure used in Germany, France and the UK, response rates for these countries are not available, as the sample composition (i.e. the contacted people) changes in the course of the field phase to meet the quotas.

addition, we checked whether the results without inconsistent respondent evaluations (i.e. choice of commission B and higher rating for commission A) differ from the overall results (see figure A.3). This is not the case and we, thus, used all complete respondent evaluations for our analysis. Finally, we also checked whether respondent characteristics influence the results. First, we separate people who use public transport from people who do not use public transport to get to work. One might expect that public transport users demand different things from such a commission than people who do not use public transport.[13] This is not the case, however. A second test concerns the differences between respondents with low and with high trust in local institutions. Here, we find some small differences in the effect sizes but not in the relative strength of the attributes when they are compared to each other (see figure A.4 and A.5 in the appendix). Finally, we analyzed whether the results differ across countries and regions (figure A.12 and A.13). The general picture does not differ markedly across countries, except for Switzerland. Here, we find that citizens deem ex-post approval by local governments more important and care less about the composition of the commission than citizens in the other three countries. This difference reflects the direct democratic referendum-logic of the Swiss political system where representation can be substituted to a certain extent by popular veto possibilities. We do not find substantive additional variation when we compare metropolitan areas within a country.

[13] E.g. the public transport non-users might be much more concerned with the budget question than with the question of the composition or the transparency of the commission.

Results

In this section we present the main results of our conjoint experiment and test the three hypotheses: i.) that the output-dimension is more important than the input- and the throughput-dimension for the evaluation of specific governance arrangements, ii.) that citizens' views of democracy guide their evaluation of specific governance arrangements and iii.) that irrespective of their views of democracy, citizens deem output the most important dimension in their evaluation of specific governance arrangements.

Hypothesis 1: Output > Throughput and Input

Figure 2 presents the results for the basic analysis of our conjoint experiment, which allows us to test hypothesis 1.

Figure 2: Basic Analysis



Note. N (Obs.)=30210, N (Resp.)=5041

Generally, the results confirm what one would expect theoretically. Citizens prefer more democratic input (elected > delegated commission members), they prefer more democratic throughput (public > non-public negotiations) and they prefer better output (0-10% > 20-30% budget over-run). Furthermore, the preference for a commission increases when the decisions of this commission need to be approved by the local authorities in the metropolitan area. Surprisingly, citizens prefer commissions taking majoritarian decisions rather than unanimous ones and commissions composed of delegates are even less preferred than commissions

composed of experts. Finally, commissions that were shown on the left side of the screen are preferred over commissions shown on the right side. We, thus, need to control for these "profile-order-effects" (Hainmueller et al. 2014, 9) in subsequent analyses as well.

Our first hypothesis stated that the output-dimension would – ceteris paribus – play a more important role in citizens' evaluations of specific governance arrangements than the input- or the throughput-dimension. The results from figure 2 corroborate this assumption. A commission with only 0-10% budget over-run is more than 17% more likely to be chosen by respondents than a commission with 20-30% budget over-run. Interestingly, the throughput-dimension seems to be the second most important one to determine respondents' choice of a commission, whereas the mode of designation for the decision-makers within a commission (election, delegation or appointment) is considered to be the least important attribute, even less so than the two formal authority dimensions.

In the research design section, we mentioned the possibility for interaction effects between attributes. For example, more democratic input might be deemed more important, when a commission has more formal authority. We tested whether such "*average component interaction effects*" (Hainmueller et al. 2014, 12) exist between our attributes. To do so, we analyzed subsets of the data for which one attribute was held constant at one level. We do not find any interaction effects between different attributes.[14]

Hypotheses 2 and 3: Guidance by Democratic Norms and the Prevalence of Output

So far, we have found support for hypothesis 1, that output is considered more important than throughput or input for the evaluation of specific governance arrangements. We now turn to the analysis for hypotheses 2 and 3, namely that citizens' views of democracy guide their evaluation of specific governance arrangements but that output-considerations nevertheless outweigh the impact of democratic norm orientations.

To do so, we compare groups of respondents across five democratic norms or trade-offs: i.) the representativeness vs. the efficiency of the decision-making process; ii.) respecting the will of the majority vs. protecting the rights of minorities; iii.) keeping decision-making processes transparent vs. enabling compromises; iv.) choosing better alternatives to the majority position vs. implementing the majority position and v.) complex decisions made by elected representatives vs. made by competent experts. For each of these trade-offs, we build three groups; one for each side of the trade-off and a third group of neutral respondents, which

[14] The results for these estimations can be found in the appendix (figure A.7-figure A.11).

means that they did not state a preference for either position and rated them equally high or low.

The results for these analyses are displayed in figures 3-7.

Figure 3: Democratic Trade-Off: Representation vs. Efficiency



Note. N (Obs.)=6090, N (Resp.)=1015



Note. N (Obs.)=7552, N (Resp.)=1260.



Note. N (Obs.)=11542, N (Resp.)=1952.

Figure 4: Democratic Trade-Off: Majority Will vs. Minority Rights



Note. N (Obs.)=10886, N (Resp.)=1817



Note. N (Obs.)=7146, N (Resp.)=1191.



Note. N (Obs.)=7152, N (Resp.)=1192.

Overall, the results from these five tables suggest that citizens' views and preferences for different aspects of democracy do indeed drive their evaluations of specific governance arrangements. Consider, for example, the trade-off between representation and efficiency: From figure 3 it becomes evident, that those who value representation more than efficiency deem approval by local governments (15% increase compared to 7.5% increase) and transparency of negotiations (18% increase compared to 7.5% increase) more important than those preferring efficiency over representation. Furthermore, the order of the attributes "elected representatives" and "independent experts" is reversed for the ones preferring

efficiency, although the difference between the two attributes is not significant for either group.

This difference is significant, however, when we look at figure 4 and compare those who deem minority rights more important with those that deem majority will more important. Furthermore, those who prefer minority rights over majority deem local government approval of the commission's decisions more important, which might reflect a preference for "checks and balances" captured in the preference for ensuring minority rights.

Figure 5: Democratic Trade-Off: Transparency vs. Compromise



Note. N (Obs.)=4644, N (Resp.)=774



Note. N (Obs.)=6586, N (Resp.)=1098.



Note. N (Obs.)=13954, N (Resp.)=2328.

Figure 6: Democratic Trade-Off: Better Alternatives vs. Majority Will



Note. N (Obs.)=7042, N (Resp.)=1174



Note. N (Obs.)=7150, N (Resp.)=1192.



Note. N (Obs.)=10992, N (Resp.)=1834.

Looking at figure 5, we find the straightforward result that those preferring transparency over compromise deem the transparency of commissions more important for their choice than those preferring compromise over transparency.

Looking at figure 6 and 7, we find that those preferring better alternatives over majority decision-making and those preferring experts making complex decisions are more favorable of commissions composed of independent experts than the groups holding the respectively opposing views. The difference is especially striking in figure 7, where the effect of experts turns negative for those who prefer representatives solving complex issues.

These results, thus, yield support for our second hypothesis that citizens' views of democracy guide their evaluations of specific governance arrangements, although the impact of the views on citizens' evaluations is not always straightforward (see for example figure 3).

So far, we only looked at which attribute effects change when citizens value different democratic norms. However, we can also look at what does *not* change across citizen groups with respect to their evaluation of commissions. When doing so across figures 3-7, one thing is striking: The strongest effect on the probability of choosing a commission is always linked to the output-dimension. More precisely, the difference between the attribute level "0-10%"- and the baseline category "20-30%"-budget over-run is the most striking one across all groups. This means that there is no variation across different democratic norm orientations when it comes to the importance of output-legitimacy. It is always deemed the most important dimension. This lends support to our hypothesis 3.

Figure 7: Democratic Trade-Off: Representatives vs. Experts



Note. N (Obs.)=10726, N (Resp.)=1789



Note. N (Obs.)=6688, N (Resp.)=1115.



Note. N (Obs.)=7770, N (Resp.)=1296.

Conclusion

How do citizens' evaluate specific governance arrangements? Our results suggest that citizens' generally value commissions that would be considered democratic from a "traditional" representative understanding: They demand input-, throughput-, and output-legitimacy and they favor governance arrangements whose formal authority is restricted by external actors. Furthermore, we do also find evidence that citizens' views of democracy drive their evaluation of governance arrangements – even in a context that is rather remote from what we normally think about when we refer to political institutions. Finally, however, we find that output-legitimacy is always the most important feature of a commission – irrespective of citizens' views of democracy. This is in line with Fritz Scharpf's (1999) famous claim that the problem-solving capacity is the most important tool for political actors to create democratic legitimacy perceptions among their constituents.

The consistency between citizens' views of democracy and their evaluation of the commissions suggests that we tapped into stable value orientations that can be mobilized for specific situations. This is an important finding, since such value orientations are often latent rather than explicit. Furthermore, the rather similar results across countries and metropolitan areas suggest that our findings can be generalized to other urban and metropolitan areas in Western Europe. At the same time, we have to be somewhat careful with generalizing the findings towards other governance arrangements in different contexts: The scenario of the experiment – construction of a new underground train line in respondents' metropolitan area of residence – is obviously geared towards solving a public problem, namely the lack of public transport capacity. In this sense, it is not astonishing that the output dimension drives respondents' evaluations to such a large extent. However, not all policies are exclusively about problem-solving. In particular, it is likely that the pattern would look different if the scenario did not only involve responses to a public problem, but also redistributive decisions that produce winners and losers. Our findings could, thus, be limited to pareto-efficient policies that do not involve redistributive issues.

Future research should therefore scrutinize our results for different policy areas and policy types in different contexts. Particularly promising would be experiments concerning welfare state reform. While some scholars engaged in conjoint experiments in this domain (Gallego and Marx 2016, Häusermann et al. 2016), they are concerned with the design of a policy and not with the evaluation of the institution that is responsible for developing the policy. In addition to the scope conditions of our findings, the key link between views of democracy and evaluations of governance arrangements has to be explored further. Further research is needed

to better understand the determinants of citizens' views of democracy but first and foremost we need to better understand how these views translate into evaluations. For which kind of citizens are these links particularly strong or weak? What intervening factors come into play here? For example, are voters of populist parties less driven by their view of democracy when evaluating governance arrangements, because they demand high input on an abstract level but especially want effective and efficient output when it comes to day-to-day politics?

Finally, our results also have implications for politics. They suggest that from a citizens' perspective the most important quality of political institutions is the capacity of "getting things done" and that procedural traits of liberal democracy are only of secondary importance. However, these procedural traits are *not* unimportant. To obtain political support, it is not enough to have a technocratic government that provides efficient and effective output and ignores the procedural side of democratic politics (cf. Caramani forthcoming) – not even in the case of a pareto-efficient public policy problem like underground line construction in metropolitan areas. While procedures are not the prime concern, they remain important features of legitimate governance arrangements and we should further disentangle the manifold ways in which substance and procedure generate political support.

References

Arneson, R.J. (2003). Debate: Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11 (1), 122-132.

Barber, B.R. (1984). *Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Brenner, N. (2003). Metropolitan Institutional Reform and the Rescaling of State Space in Contemporary Western Europe. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 10 (4), 297-324.

Bromage, A.W. (1958). Political Representation in Metropolitan Areas. *American Political Science Review*, 52 (2), 406-418.

Bühlmann, M., & Kriesi, H. (2013). Models for Democracy. In H. Kriesi, M. Bühlmann, & D. Bochsler, F. Esser, S. Lavenex, J. Matthes (Eds.), *Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization* (pp. 44-68) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Caramani, D. (forthcoming). Will vs. Reason: The Populist and Technocratic Forms of Representation and Their Critique to Party Government. *American Political Science Review*,.

Chu, Y.H., Bratton, M., & Lagos, M., Shastri, S., Tessler, M. (2008). Public Opinion and Democratic Legitimacy. *Journal of Democracy*, 19 (2), 74-87.

Ceka, B., & Magalhães, P.C. (2016). How People Understand Democracy: A Social Dominance Approach. In M. Ferrín, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy* (pp. 90-110) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, J. (1997). Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy. In J. Bohman, & W. Rehg (Eds.), *Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics* (pp. 407-437) Cambridge: MIT Press.

Coppedge, M., & Gerring, J. (2011). Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9 (2), 247-267.

Dahlberg, S., & Holmberg, S. (2014). Democracy and Bureaucracy: How their Quality Matters for Popular Satisfaction. *West European Politics*, 37 (3), 515-537.

Dalton, R.J. (2004). *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices. The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Deas, I. (2014). The Search for Territorial Fixes in Subnational Governance: City-Regions and the Disputed Emergence of Post-Political Consensus in Manchester, England. *Urban Studies*, 51 (11), 2285-2314.

Denters, B. (2014). Beyond 'What Do I Get?' Functional and Procedural Sources of Dutch Citizens' Satisfaction with Local Democracy. *Urban Research & Practice*, 7 (2), 153-168.

Easton, D. (1965). *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley.

European Social Survey (2012). *Round 6. Questionnaire: Rotating Module E.* http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=6 [13.07.2016].

Eurostat (2014). *European Cities – Spatial Dimension.* http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/European_cities_-_spatial_dimension [21.07.2016].

Ferrín, M., & Kriesi, H. (2016). *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fuchs, D. (1999). The Democratic Culture of Unified Germany. In P. Norris (Ed.), *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Government* (pp. 123-145) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fuchs, D. (2011). Explaining Support for European Integration: An Attitudinal Model. In D. Fuchs, & H.D. Klingemann (Eds.), *Cultural diversity, European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU* (pp. 220-246), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Gallego, A., & Marx, P. (2016). Multi-Dimensional Preferences for Labour Market Reforms: A Conjoint Experiment. *Journal of European Public Policy*,.

Gerber, E.R., & Gibson, C.C. (2009). Balancing Regionalism and Localism: How Institutions and Incentives Shape American Transportation Policy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53 (3), 633-648.

Gerring, J. (2007). *Case Study Research. Principles and Practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hainmueller, J., Yamamoto, T., & Hopkins, D.J. (2014). Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments. *Political Analysis*, 22, 1-30.

Haus, M. (2014). Mirror of the State or Independent Image? Conceptual Perspectives on the Question of a Legitimacy Shift to the Output Dimension in Local Democracy. *Urban Research & Practice*, 7 (2), 123-136.

Häusermann, S., Kurer, T., & Traber, D. (2016). *Trade-Offs in Social Policy Reforms: Interacting Policy Context and Socio-Structural Characteristics*. Paper presented at the 2016 ECPR Joint Sessions, Pisa, April 24-28.

Held, D. (2010). *Models of Democracy*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Héritier, A. (2003). Composite Democracy in Europe: The Role of Transparency and Access to Information. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10 (5), 814-833.

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2003). Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governance. *American Political Science Review*, 97 (2), 233-243.

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2004). Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 37 (3), 415-420.

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2015). Delegation and Pooling in International Organizations. *Review of International Organizations*, 10 (3), 305-328.

Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Schakel, A.H., Niedzwiecki, S., Chapman Osterkatz, S., Shair-Rosenfield, S. (2016). *A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance Volume I: Measuring Regional Authority*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hulst, R., & Van Montfort, A. (2007). *Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Kriesi, H., Saris, W., & Moncagatta, P. (2016). The Structure of Europeans' Views of Democracy: Citizens' Models of Democracy. In M. Ferrín, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy* (pp. 64-89) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heinelt, H., & Kübler, D. (2005). *Metropolitan Governance. Capacity, Democracy and the Dynamics of Place*. London: Routledge.

Kübler, D., & Pagano, M.A. (2012). Urban Politics as Multilevel Analysis. In K. Mossberger, P. John, & S.E. Clarke (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics* (pp. 114-129) New York: Oxford University Press.

Lackowska, M., & Mikuła, Ł. (2015). How Metropolitan Can You Go? Citizenship in Polish City-Regions. *Journal of Urban Affairs*,.

Lefèvre, C. (1998). Metropolitan Government and Governance in Western Countries: A Critical Review. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 22 (1), 9-25.

Lijphart, A. (2012). *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Maslow, A.H. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. *Psychological Review*, 50, 370-396.

Norris, P. (1999). *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Papadopoulos, Y., & Warin, P. (2007). Are Innovative, Participatory and Deliberative Procedures in Policy Making Democratic and Effective?. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46 (4), 445-472.

Perry, S. (2014). Was erwarten Bürgerinnen und Bürger von ihrer Stadt?. In J.W. Van Deth (Ed.), *Demokratie in der Grossstadt. Ergebnisse des ersten Mannheimer Demokratie Audit* (pp. 23-50), Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Rothstein, B. (2009). Creating Political Legitimacy. Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53 (3), 311-330.

Savitch, H.V., & Vogel, R.K. (2009). Regionalism and Urban Politics. In J.S. Davies, & D.L. Imbroscio (Eds.), *Theories of Urban Politics* (pp. 106-124) 2nd ed. London: SAGE.

Scharpf, F.W. (1999). *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schedler, A., & Sarsfield, R. (2007). Democrats with Adjectives: Linking Direct and Indirect Measures of Democratic Support. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46, 637-659.

Schmidt, V.A. (2013). Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and 'Throughput'. *Political Studies*, 61 (1), 2-22.

Schumpeter, J.A. (2010). *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. London: Routledge.

Sellers, J.M., Kübler, D., & Walks, A.R., Walter-Rogg, M. (2013). *The Political Ecology of the Metropolis*. Colchester: ECPR.

Swianiewicz, P., & Lackowska, M. (2008). Cosmopolitans of Small Fatherlands. *Miscellanea Geographica*, 13, 197-208.

World Bank (2016). *Indicators: Urban Population (% of total).* http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS [21.07.2016].

Appendix

Table A.1: Democratic Trade-Offs

Often democracy is a compromise. Please tell us what you think about the following statements. To what extent do you agree or disagree? Again, there is no right or wrong answer, so please just indicate what you think.
0= strongly disagree, 10=strongly agree, 88=don't know
[for each pair a separate page in the online survey]

[Representation vs. Efficiency]	1) It is important for the people's elected representatives to have a say in running government, even though this may slow down the process of policy-making. 2) The government's policy-making process should be organised as efficiently as possible, even if this sometimes implies bypassing the parliament for some urgent decisions.
[Majority Will vs. Minority Rights]	1) Citizens should have the right to vote on any constitutional clause, even if this leads to the abolishment or limitation of constitutional safeguards, such as certain minority rights. 2) The constitution should guarantee certain constitutional safeguards that cannot be abolished by a popular vote, such as certain minority rights.
[Transparency vs. Compromise]	1) Political decision-making processes should always be as transparent as possible, even if this makes it harder to reach a compromise. 2) Sometimes it is more important that decision-makers are able to reach a compromise than to make the decision-making process transparent for everyone at anytime.
[Better Alternatives vs. Majority Will]	1) Policy-makers should be prepared to revise majority positions in the light of better alternatives, even if the latter are proposed by a minority. 2) Policy-makers cannot always take into consideration all possible alternatives when taking a decision. The important point is that their decisions reflect the will of the majority.
[Representatives vs. Experts]	1) Even complex issues should always be decided by elected representatives of the people and not by unelected experts. 2) Independent experts are often more qualified to decide complex issues than elected politicians.

Figure A.1: Histograms of Democratic Trade-Offs



Figure A.2: Inconsistent Answers and Missing Values by Rows



Figure A.3: All Answers vs. Consistent Answers Only



Note. N (Obs.)=30210, N (Resp.)=5041



Note. N (Obs.)=30210, N (Resp.)=5041



Note. N (Obs.)=27384, N (Resp.)=5015



Note. N (Obs.)=27384, N (Resp.)=5015

Figure A.4: Public Transport Users vs. Non-Users



Note. N (Obs.)=9302, N (Resp.)=1553



Note. N (Obs.)=13288, N (Resp.)=2219



Note. N (Obs.)=10510, N (Resp.)=1754



Note. N (Obs.)=12080, N (Resp.)=2018

Figure A.6: Results for Local Political Trust



Note. N (Obs.)=12324, N (Resp.)=2056



Note. N (Obs.)=13974, N (Resp.)=2333

Figure A.7: Input-Legitimacy: Composition Types







Figure A.8: Throughput-Legitimacy: Transparency Types



Figure A.9: Output-Legitimacy: Types of Budget Over-Run



Figure A.10: Formal Authority: Types of Decision-Modes



Figure A.11: Formal Authority: Implementation Types



Figure A.12: Cross-National Variation



Note. N (Obs.)=6894, N (Resp.)=1156



Note. N (Obs.)=7548, N (Resp.)=1257



Note. N (Obs.)=7848, N (Resp.)=1308



Note. N (Obs.)=7920, N (Resp.)=1320

Figure A.13: Cross-Regional Variation